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08-22-2006

THE SILVER LINING

Martin van Creveld, a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is considered one of the world's most eminent experts on military history and strategy. His books include "The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force" (1998) and his widely influential 1991 book, "The Transformation of War." Van Creveld famously wrote that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was "the most foolish war since Emperor Augustus in 9 B.C. sent his legions into Germany and lost them."

By Martin van Creveld

JERUSALEM — Unnoticed by most analysts, a surprise is shaping up in the Middle East — the site, recently, of a war between Israel and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah organization. The cease-fire imposed, or rather called for, by the United Nations Security Council is holding.

Enforcing a cease-fire between states is hard enough; doing so in wars between a state and a nonstate organization such as Hezbollah is much harder still. This is because fronts are usually nonexistent, the nonstate actors hard to distinguish from the civilian population, and the nonstate chains of command relatively weak.

To me, therefore, the fact that the cease-fire has held comes as a great surprise. It stands in sharp contrast to the many cease-fires announced at the beginning of the second intifada, none of which materialized. Not even the Israeli raid last week in the Bekaa Valley, which, according to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, constituted a clear violation, led to the resumption of hostilities.

How to interpret these facts? One possibility, of course, is that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is already preparing for the next round. It is, however, also possible to imagine other reasons. Nasrallah's declared intention in launching the July 12 raid that triggered the war was to bring back the Lebanese prisoners in Israel's hands; not only did he fail, but currently there are more prisoners in Israeli jails than before the war started. As to Shebaa Farms — the disputed territory where the Lebanese, Syrian and Israeli borders meet — forget it.

True, Nasrallah’s men fought well and inflicted casualties on the Israel Defense Forces as well as on Israel's civilian population. The price, however, was extremely heavy: a thousand dead, thousands more wounded, as many as 900,000 refugees, southern Lebanon and the Lebanese infrastructure in ruins. Moreover, it was a price paid mainly by members of his own Shiite community.

In other words, it is just possible that, by means of its “disproportionate response” (as the Europeans say) and its “Majnun” (madman)-like behavior (as many Arabs say), Israel may have re-established its deterrent power vis-à-vis Hezbollah and Lebanon. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s sudden talk about peace, as well as his defense minister’s announcement that anybody (on the Lebanese side) who violates the cease-fire will be harshly dealt with, may be additional indications of this.

Another possibility is that Syria has a hand in the game — some prominent Israelis have suddenly started talking about peace with that country. I am no expert on Syrian politics, but if I were President Bashar al-Assad I would be very worried about Hezbollah's success, such as it was. After all, back in 1982 his father only barely managed to crush an Islamic uprising that was threatening to bring him down and kill him.

Perhaps more is going on then meets the eye; perhaps Assad Jr. is thinking about the possibility of pulling a Gaddafi, who accomodated with the West, in return for the Golan Heights. Some Americans, too, seem to be thinking along these lines, arguing that what is needed is to detach Syria from Iran.

War is a moral and physical struggle, by means of the latter. In the final analysis, what counts is not so much the results on the ground, but the psyche of both sides. Back in 1973-74, many Israelis felt their country had lost the October War. Gradually, however, it transpired that this interpretation was wrong.

Whatever else it may have done, the war finally put an end to any expectation among most Arab leaders that they might destroy the “Zionist entity;” whereas some of those who did not agree with this assessment, such as Egypt’s chief of staff, Gen. Saad el Shazly, ended up writing their memories in exile. The outcome was peace that, in spite of all provocations, has now held for 27 years.

Might not this war lead to a similar development? Time will tell.