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Global Viewpoint  |
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 GLOBAL
VIEWPOINTGLOBAL
ECONOMIC VIEWPOINTEUROPEAN
VIEWPOINTNOBEL
LAUREATES PLUS |
04-10-2006 GOOD SHIITE, BAD SHIITE Graham E. Fuller is a former vice chair of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA. His most recent book is "The Future of Political Islam." By Graham E. Fuller WASHINGTON -- The U.S. is reaching the breaking point with the Shiites in Iraq. The quiescence to date of this dominant and relatively united sectarian force has been the key factor in the U.S.’s ability to keep the lid on in Iraq so far. That is now changing, and we are reaching a fateful turning in the road with them.The Shiites have never had any particular love for the U.S. They are bitter about what they saw as the U.S. betrayal of them in 1991 when the elder President Bush called for uprisings against Saddam at the end of the Kuwait war; when they did rise in insurrection, the U.S. stood by while Saddam’s forces brutally put the insurrection down with huge Shiite losses. It was only 27 years ago — the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the crisis of American diplomats held hostage in Tehran — that a Washington mantra quickly developed: “Shiite bad, Sunni good.” The Shiites were, after all, the anti-American revolutionaries in the region. But then, after the emergence of al-Qaida, Sept. 11, the outbreak of the Sunni insurrection against the U.S. occupation in Iraq, and Iraqi Shiite quiescence, Washington’s working mantra reversed: It became “Shiite good, Sunni bad.” Today it is hard to tell who the good guys are anymore. One thing was clear on the eve of the war in Iraq: The Shiites would favor the overthrow of Saddam and a brief U.S. occupation only if Washington promised to deliver power into the hands of the Shiite majority, via the ballot box. This has now come to pass. As far as most Shiites are concerned, the U.S. has basically fulfilled its historic mission and should go home. The Shiites are, however, tactically divided as to when the U.S. should go home. Some still want the U.S. to stay on a bit longer to help put down the insurgency and stabilize the country, thus making the Shiites’ dominant rule more secure. But other Shiites -- by now maybe a majority -- fear that their dependence upon the U.S. sword is damaging to the very legitimacy of Shiite governance in Iraq. Under these conditions, the Sunni minority clearly believes its own historic role in Iraqi politics will be vindicated as “the one force that stood up to American occupation.” Thus for most Shiites, perhaps the quickest way to gain national legitimacy and acquire Iraqi nationalist credentials is to join the call against the U.S. occupation. Shiite firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr grasped this principle a long time ago and is, in fact, trying to forge a Shiite-Sunni coalition based on the common interest of ending the occupation now. Muqtada’s street-smart politics have shown a lot of savvy to date, and this is the line he is now pursuing, with some success. Now that Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has delivered Bush’s jarring message that the current Iraqi prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, is not acceptable to them and should not seek a second term, the Shiite break with Washington may be nearing. By no means do all Shiites want Jaafari as prime minister, but the U.S. in their view has now delivered a fairly naked diktat by telling the Shiites who should or should not run their ostensibly sovereign government. U.S. pressure upon the Shiites to give up control of such vital power ministries as Intelligence and Interior are certain nonstarters; the Shiites have not waited for half a century or more to achieve a position of some power in the state only to yield these vital security functions to their erstwhile oppressors and current rivals. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani will work mightily to ensure the Shiites do not break ranks on these issues. It may be that, under pressure, the Shiite alliance will decide to switch their candidate for prime minister in the name of preserving unity. But any new candidate, in an agreement likely forged by Sistani, must also placate the many Shiite elements cool or hostile to the U.S., including Jaafari, Sadr and the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). It may make some sense for the U.S. to help overcome Sunni fears and grievances by siding with their calls for greater Sunni power within the governing system. But the current Shiite political dominance is quite legal, based on a constitution the U.S. helped draft, and that reflects the absolute demographic majority of Shiites. It is hard to wrench that prize out of Shiite hands at a point in Iraqi history when, at least for the moment, sectarian loyalties are the coinage of daily politics and the primary refuge of safety for each citizen. That situation will not last forever, but for the indefinite future the game leaves scant room for compromise. Even if Washington at this points “tilts” toward the Sunnis to lessen Iran’s voice among the Shiites and to prevent the slide into civil war, the Sunnis offer precious little consolation for Bush’s woes. At bottom, the Sunnis are even more anti-U.S. and more pan-Arab in outlook than the Shiites. They are absolutely determined to end the occupation as soon as possible. The Sunni clerics are hard-line anti-U.S., and their only serious rivals are secular Baathists. Placating the Sunnis now will thus do little more than hasten a public Shiite break with Washington. It will not lessen insurgent actions to push the U.S. out. However clever Ambassador Khalilzad’s efforts at divide-and-rule may be, few of his options are good. Neither variation of the old “good-bad” mantras are reliable anymore. The sad truth is that Sunnis and Shiites are coming to vie with each other in pushing to get rid of the Americans. And, sadly, vocal opposition to the U.S. occupation is one of the quickest paths to national legitimacy for almost any Iraqi politician. (c) 2006, Global Viewpoint Distributed by Tribune Media Services, INC. (Distributed APRIL 10, 2006) |
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