THREE PILLARS OF PEACE: BORDERS, EFFECTIVE PALESTINIAN GOVERNANCE,
AN END TO SETTLEMENTS
By Shimon Peres
Shimon Peres is the former foreign minister and former prime minister
of Israel who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, along
with Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, to bring peace to the Middle East.
A sidebar by Edward Said, the Palestinian thinker, follows.
TEL AVIV -- The peace process between us and the Palestinians is
currently at an impasse, not because of a lack of peace plans, but because
the confidence that peace partners still exist has faded. Israel -- and
not only Israel -- no longer has faith in Yasser Arafat. Maybe, too, the
Palestinians look with skepticism upon Ariel Sharon's declarations of
being prepared to make ''painful concessions'' on behalf of peace.
Many Israelis are starting to have serious doubts about the ability of
the Palestinians to act as peace partners.
Is this really so?
Three and a half million Palestinians (1.2 million in Gaza, close to 2
million in the West Bank and the rest in Jerusalem and its periphery)
live in the ''territories,'' between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.
Attempted terror attacks on Israel that originate from the territories
are practically daily fare. Most are carried out by suicide-bomber cells
or individual terrorists. Hundreds of Israelis have been killed and thousands
wounded in the past two years. As a result, a closure has been imposed
on the territories, many Palestinians lost their lives and homes, generating
deep economic deprivation and augmenting hate.
Under these circumstances, no one is doing what they would like to do.
And everyone is forced to act in a way they would prefer not to.
Yet, roughly the same number of Palestinians (about 3.5 million) are living
on the other bank of the Jordan River, in the Kingdom of Jordan. Virtually
no security problems exist between Israel and the Jordanians. Two towns
-- Eilat and Akaba -- are located at the southern tip of Israel and Jordan,
a few miles across from the other. During the whole of the 54 years of
Israel's existence, not a single bullet was shot by one against the other.
The 120-mile-long Arava Valley connects the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. The
border runs along this plain. Mostly it is not marked by barbed wires
or mine fields or moats. The area is as secure as nature intended it to
be. And the Jordan River, which serves as Israel's border with Jordan,
idly winds its way from the Dead Sea to the Yarmouk River, which is where
it ends. The Jordanians prevent infiltrators from entering Israel, and
two bridges that stretch across the border and over the river are used
for the movement of people and goods.
How come reasonable -- and even friendly -- ties distinguish the relations
between Israel and Jordan (the majority of whose citizens are of Palestinian
descent), whereas with the Palestinians, the scenario is different?
The reasons are threefold:
-- An established and secure border exists between us and the Jordanians.
A similar border has as yet not been marked between Israel and the Palestinians.
-- In Jordan, there is an effective government, whereas on the Palestinian
side, the Palestinian Authority has not succeeded in imposing its authority
over the various terrorist factions. Each group shoots in a different
direction, discounting Palestinian governance.
-- Clearly, there are no Israeli settlements on the Jordanian side. And
in any case, there are no disputes over land between the Israelis and
the Jordanians, just as none exists over borders.
The conclusion is obvious. It is vital that a border between us and the
Palestinians be demarcated. When a border does not exist on the ground,
it does not exist between peace and violence either. Despite the differences
of opinion on the delineation of the border, I believe a settlement regarding
an agreed and secure border can be reached, on the basis of President
Bush's vision of two states -- Israeli and Palestinian -- and the Quartet's
road map, that broaches this issue.
More complicated is Palestinian governance. We signed an agreement with
Arafat in Oslo in 1993. This accord was meant to have engendered a permanent
peace. At the time, Arafat stood at the head of the PLO, that until then
had used terror as a means to reach its objectives. In Oslo, he committed
himself to stop terrorist activities, and we, on our part, started to
withdraw from the territories accordingly.
However, it turned out that Arafat, who was the chosen and uncontested
leader of the PLO, failed to deliver the goods and become the effective
leader of a Palestinian state in the making. The PLO was composed of a
group of armed organizations. These factions refused to disarm after the
Palestinian Authority was created, while claiming to accept Arafat's leadership.
Arafat probably thought he could induce them politically to disarm and
come to terms with Palestinian Authority governance. This did not happen.
The dissident organizations are albeit in the minority. Yet a minority
that believes in the bullet more than in the ballot.
Arafat did not dare resort to force and establish a central body that
would control all usage of arms, by all factions. Thus, the Palestinian
Authority lost all effective authority, and any cease-fire agreement made
with it was erratic, in that at times it was implemented by only one of
12 separate organizations and at others by all. In truth, Arafat's authority
and the prestige of the Palestinian Authority were undermined by those
very organizations that ignored all of the Authority's orders and turned
it into a laughingstock.
The unavoidable conclusion is that to create an effective Palestinian
Authority, the Palestinians need to institute reform in their system of
governance. For everything to depend on a single person is an implausible
proposition, especially when that individual is not prepared to take the
necessary steps to ensure security and revive the peace process.
The need for reform of the Palestinian Authority is acknowledged by most
countries across the world. It is also recognized by the three Arab states
that are trying to promote peace in the region: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Jordan. It is also accepted by a large portion of the Palestinians and
The nature of the reform is endorsed by all concerned: the division among
three powers -- legislative, judicial and executive -- to enjoy independence,
without being subjected to individual whims; the appointment of a prime
minister to conduct Authority affairs effectively; control of all splinter
organizations and armed groups under one coherent chain of command; and
transparency in all financial activities.
Arafat agreed to this reform, reaffirming the need for a prime minister
just last week. But he has not put this into practice, along with many
other promises. Implementation of the verbal assurances never followed
until now. The time has come to ask the Palestinians for a time-table
for the reform. Otherwise, confusion will continue to reign, as will the
rising number of victims and unbearable suffering on both sides.
Israel must resume negotiations to reach an agreement on an accepted border,
enabling a withdrawal from the territories accordingly. The vicious cycle
arising from the concept of a cease-fire first and peace negotiations
after needs to be broken. It is hard to achieve a cease-fire by the sheer
use of force. It is true that terrorists are killed in operations to cease
fire by fire, yet terrorism itself feeds on the very measures aimed at
stopping terror. I do not suggest that the fight against terrorists stop.
Yet I do feel it is necessary to fight the incentives to terror in parallel,
namely: to negotiate, give hope, reduce pressure. A cease-fire needs to
be backed by civil motivation. To fight terror, while also creating a
political climate to stop it, is not a contradiction in terms.
The conflict is tough and complex. But at least the existence of a peace
plan -- one that is more or else acceptable to most -- can make it easier
to resolve. It was once believed that partners produced a plan. What is
called for today is that the plan -- let's call it a road map of sorts
-- produce partners on both sides, with the ability to execute it.
THE MISSING GESTURE
By Edward Said
Edward Said is professor of comparative literature at Columbia University
and a leading Palestinian thinker. His comment below is from a talk on
Feb. 20 to the UCLA International Institute.
My friend Daniel Barenboim -- the Israeli-born musician with whom I co-sponsor
music seminars between Israeli and Palestinian students -- is most exceptional.
He is exceptional because he understands what no Israeli politician understands:
Much more important than fighting over who is right and who is wrong is
the need for a gesture -- a gesture of compassion, a gesture of acknowledgment
and responsibility. No Israeli leader has ever, ever, made a gesture of
this sort toward the Palestinians. Not one. None. Not one gesture saying,
''We are responsible for what happened'' in 1948 and afterward, the way
the Poles have said, for example, about what they did to the Jews. Even
the Japanese have acknowledged what they did to the Chinese.
One of the qualities that distinguishes Barenboim is that he was curious
to see who we Palestinians were. Like so many Israelis, he grew up never
meeting a Palestinian. But then he wanted to see us, to meet us. Not for
the Palestinians' sake, but for his own. He wanted to understand because
we occupy the same land. He wanted to look honestly at the whole picture.
What is missing, therefore, from the whole Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is someone on the political level like Barenboim who provides a compassionate,
universalizing view of the whole -- someone like Nelson Mandela who will
say ''we can find a way of living together, each in our own manner, as
equals, despite the past.'' The starting point of this future, though,
is not a plan but a gesture -- a gesture of responsibility for the past.
(c) 2003, Global Viewpoint. Distributed by Tribune Media Services International.
For immediate release (Distributed 2/24/03)